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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to the provision of UCA Section 63G-4-403 jurisdiction of this
Petition for Review is in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals. This is an
appeal from the decision of the Lone Peak Public Safety District entered on
February 18, 2009.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Was the ruling of the Board, after finding that Appellant made statements
while under the influence of alcohol and legally prescribed prescription
medication, a correct application of law justifying termination?
Standard of review: "When reviewing a formal adjudicative proceeding
the standard of review set out in Utah Code section 59-1-610 applies. The
court must review the Commission's finding of fact under a i(substantial
evidence" standard. See Utah Code Ann Section 59-1-610 (a) (1996). In
other words, the court of appeals must uphold those findings of fact that
are supported by substantial evidence, or "that quantum and quality of
relevant evidence which is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
support a conclusion. The court of appeals must review the Commission's

conclusion of law for correctness giving no deference to the tribunals
legal determination. See Section 59-1-610 (1) (b). Year gin Inc. v.
Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Comm % 20 P. 3 rd 287, 291 (UT 2001)
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Ut App. 1991)
2. Whether the termination of Appellant was arbitrary and oppressive and in
violation of his Due Process Rights pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United Stated Constitution and specifically violating
appellant's fundamental liberty interest in Free Speech secured by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution?
Standard of Review: The court of appeals must review the Commission's
conclusion of law for correctness giving no deference to the tribunal's
legal determination. See Section 59-1-610 (1) (b). Yeargin Inc. v.
Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Comm % 20 P 3 rd 287, 291 (UT 2001)
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23, 27 (Ut App. 1991)
Due process challenges are questions of general law and no deference to
the agency's determination of what constitutes due process as reflected by
the actual hearing, UtahDept of Admin. Servs.v. Public Service
Commission, 658 P.2d. 602, 608 (UT 1983). See also Bunnell v. Industrial
Comm% 740 P.2d 1331,1333 (Utah 1987).

3. Whether Appellant was deprived of his constitutionally protected right to
employment because the District exceeded its narrowly defined authority
limiting punishment of employees only for acts committed in public, in
direct violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the
Constitution of the United States.
Standard of Review: The court of appeals must review the Commission fs
conclusion of law for correctness giving no deference to the tribunal's
legal determination. See Section 59-1-610 (1) (b). Yeargin Inc. v.
Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Comm % 20 P. 3 rd 287,291 (UT 2001)
Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney 818 P.2d 23,27 (Ut App. 1991)
4. Whether the Board of Appeals erred in finding that termination was a
proportionate and proper sanction for his action?
Standard of Review: In determining whether the sanction ofdismisal is
warranted the Appellant must show either (1) that the facts do not support
the action taken by the Department or (2) that the charges do not warrant
the sanction imposed (Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm % 8 P.3rd
1048). In reviewing whether the "charges warrant termination " the
decision is evaluated to determine "if the Board has abused its discretion
or exceeded its authority. Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service Comm %
111 P.3rd 474, 477,2007 UT App 336).
6

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS
DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE
1. Constitution of the United States-Bill of Rights Amendment I (Speech)
2. Constitution of the State of Utah Article 1 Section 1
3. Constitution of the United States Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process)
4. Section 2 of the General Provisions of the Lone Peak Public Safety District
Policy
5. Utah Code Section 76-5-107 Terroristic Threats
6. Utah Code Section 76-8-313 Threatening elected officials ~ Assault.
7. Utah Code Section 76-8-314 elected officials defined
8. Utah Code Section 17B-1-803
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE
The challenged findings on this appeal concern whether the words spoken
during a 2 a.m. surreptitiously recorded telephone conversation between Travis
Turner and his former spouse can be deemed as misconduct justifying termination
and whether the words spoken during the conversation can be considered as a legal
threat or a violation of any law.
7

MARSHALED EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FINDING OF
THE LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT APPEALS BOARD
On September 7,2008 at 2 o'clock a.m. during a surreptitiously recorded
telephone conversation between Travis Turner and his former wife, Tara Turner,
Travis Turner made the following statement, which is the nexus or core element
forming the basis of Mr. Turner's termination:
"I will kill people, Tara. And I'll start with that fat fuck Chad
Smith. You think I am fucking kidding? You think I'm kidding? I will
go postal. And I have plenty of guns and ammo to do it." (Transcript
of telephone conversation entered into evidence as Exhibit 2 R p. 366
pages 27-28) see also R p. 89 1. 14-21, R p. 95 115-12, testimony of
Tara Turner, R p. 501. 7-12 testimony of Chief Bodkin.

In addition to the telephonic recording, Tara Turner testified to the
following alleged statements of Travis Turner which she also testified to in
support of a protective order she sought after the September 7, 2008
telephone call set forth in 1 above.
"I think you should drop the charges with Stephanie." R p. 971.4-5; Lehi
Police Dept "Narrative Statement of Fact" Exhibit 3 R p. 375.
"I know that me asking you to do this is wrong and I could lose my job,
but she is young and you are going to destroy her future with a criminal
record." (R. p. 971. 10-12, Exhibit 3 R p. 376).

8

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the decision of the Lone Peak Public Safety District
Board of Appeal conducted over a three evening period on January 22, February 5,
and February 22, 2009 upholding the termination of Travis Turner, a Lone Peak
police officer.
Early in the morning on of February 7, 2009 prior to going to bed, Travis
Turner consumed alcohol and took his regularly prescribed anxiety medication
together with Loritab and Klonopin (R p.28 1. 21, R p. 2291. 1) Mr. Turner's
experience on Klonopin was that it affected his judgment and memory and really
"through him for a loop" (R p.2441.1-3). At approximately 2 a.m. Travis was
awaken by a telephone call from his former spouse, Tara Turner (R p.228 1. 3-7; R
p. 229 1. 5.) The telephone conversation was surreptitiously recorded by Tara
Turner (R p. 85 1. 8-9; R. p. 242 1. 11-13; R p.418, Finding of Appeals Board 11).
During the telephone conversation Travis Turner was under the influence of
alcohol and prescription medications (R. p.419 Appeal Board Finding of Fact 14)
Tara Turner took the recording to the Lehi Police Department and later,
delivered a copy to Lt. Gwilliam of the Lone Peak Police Department (R p. 1401.
3-6).

9

A temporary protective order was issued by the Fourth District Court on
September 8, 2008, served on Travis Turner on September 9,2008 and dismissed
on October 9,2008 following a hearing before the Court Commissioner (R. p.282
1. 2-5).l As a result of the issuance of the protective order Travis Turner was placed
on administrative leave and the Department commenced an internal investigation
concerning Travis Turner.
*\

Following the internal affairs investigation Chief Botkin conducted a predisciplinary hearing. On November 21, 2008 Chief Botkin issued a termination
recommendation (R. p.358). Chief Botkin's findings concluded that Travis Turner
violated specific district policies that included; "Conduct which discredits the
District," "Violations of criminal laws," "Conduct unbecoming an employee" and
"Acts evidencing moral turpitude."
On November 24,2008 the recommendation of Chief Botkin was "grieved" by
email to Ted J. Stillman, Director Lone Peak Public Safety District and on
November 26,2008 said Grievance was supplemented (Appendix p.l). Director
Stillman affirmed the decision of Chief Botkin on December 4, 2008 (R p. 1)

1

At the time of the hearing before the Appeals Board the decision of the Commissioner
dismissing the protective order was on appeal to the District Court.
2

Chief Botkin is incorrectly referred to throughout the record as Chief "Bodkin" for the purpose
of this brief Chief Botkin's correct name will be utilized
10

On December 8, 2008 the decision of Director Stillman, to affirm the
termination of Travis Turner, was appealed to the Lone Peak Public Safety District
Board of Appeal (R. p. 380-383).
Following three evening of hearings, the Lone Peak Public Safety District
Board of Appeal, on a 3-1 vote, issued factual and legal conclusions upholding the
termination of Travis Turner. The Board specifically concluded that:
Mr. Turners conduct on September 7, 2008 constituted
"misconduct" categorized as; "Conduct which discredits the
department," "Conduct unbecoming and employee," and "acts
evidencing moral turpitude." (R. p. 421 Ruling of the Appeal Board
finding 3).

Although the Appeals Board specifically found that, at the time of the recorded
telephone call, "Mr. Turner was under the influence of alcohol and legally
prescribed medications" (R. p. 419 Appeal Board Finding of Fact 14) the Board
concluded that being under the influence of alcohol and legally prescribed
medication;
"does not mitigate against Mr. Turner being disciplined for this
misconduct but does in fact argue in favor of the District needing to
discipline Mr. Turner (R. p. 421 Appeal Board Conclusion 4).

3

The Board had ample evidence to support this finding based on the Testimony of Travis Turner
regarding how Klonopin affected him (R. p. 238- L. 1-3) together with pharmaceutical data
establishing side effects of Klonopin and Zolpidem (Ambien).
11

The Board further held that termination was justified because the September
7,2008 conversation;
".. .involved threats of violence, including the threat to use a
gun and involved outside police agencies
potentially putting
the residents of Alpine City and Highland City at risk (R. p.
421 Appeal Board Conclusion 5).

Prior to Appellant's termination he had only one written reprimand during his
employment with the District (R. p. 420; Appeal Board finding 23).4 Mr. Turner
had no memory of participating in the September 7, 2008 conversation (R. p. 243 L
20-23, R. p. 260,1. 11, R. p.267 1. 8-11,), although he acknowledged that it was his
voice on the tape recording (R. p. 244 1. 14-17, Appeal Board Decision R.p.418
Finding 12).

4

The only prior reprimand in Appellant's employment file was in the form of a letter of
caution received by Travis Turner approximately seven years prior to this incident when he was
cautioned by Lt. Gwilliam because he wore a short sleeve shirt on a designated long sleeve day
(Rp.179 L 12-20; R. p. 184 L 441).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
POINT I
The Lone Peak Public Safety District Board of Appeal, after finding that
Appellant's statements were made while under the influence of alcohol and
legally prescribed prescription medication, committed error by misapplying the
law and upholding the termination of Appellant.
POINT II
The Lone Peak Public Safety District violated Appellants Fourteenth
Amendment Substantive Due Process Rights when it upheld his termination
based solely on the content of a surreptitiously recorded private conversation
where there was no evidence of intent to communicate a threat and based further
on Appellants lack of capacity to foresee that his non remembered statements
could reasonably be interpreted as a threat, in violation of the exercise of
Appellants fundamental liberty interest in free speech as guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.
POINT m
The Lone Peak Public Safety District exceeded its authority to sanction
Appellant by ignoring its own Rules and Regulations which limit the authority
13

of the district to punish employees only for acts committed in public, in
violation of Appellants First and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to the
Constitution of the United States.
POINT IV
The Board of Appeals erred in finding that termination was a proportionate
and proper sanction for his action
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The Lone Peak Public Safety District Board of Appeal, committed error
by misapplying the law and upholding the termination of Appellant.

This court has previously ruled on a case that is striking similar to the
underlying facts of this case dealing with statements made while under the
influence of prescription medication, but with important factual and critical legal
differences, Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm. 8 p.3d 1048, (UT App
2000).
In Kelly, a Salt Lake City police officer, intoxicated due to the effects of
Ambien, repeatedly called the police and fire dispatch center. The calls were of
a bizarre and inappropriate nature, included sexual innuendo, and false
information regarding a reported fire. Dispatch learned the identity of the caller
14

and after checking on her welfare reported the incident to the police department
Kelly, 1050. An Internal Affairs investigation was thereafter conducted and the
Chief of Police decided to terminate officer Kelly not based on this one incident
but rather Kelly's "history of sustained complaints," and "because of the gravity
of her latest misconduct, coupled with her employment history" Id. 1051. This is
where the facts of this appeal dramatically divergefromKelly.
The Board of Appeal in the present action specifically concluded that
although there was some testimony that prior conduct of Officer Turner affected
the Department that;
"this personal conduct alone, being remote in time to the
termination at issue in this hearing, and not the subject of any written
discipline by the District when it first became known to the District,
does not rise to the level of being "misconduct" or "cause" under the
District's policies and cannot be basis for the termination of Mr.
Turner (R. p. 420 Board of Appeals Decision Conclusion 2).

During the hearing of Officer Turners appeal, no evidence of other
complaints or similar action by Officer Turner was introduced. Officer Turner
had recently been promoted to Sergeant (R. p. 417 Board of Appeals Decision
finding 4); his employment file contained only one written reprimand that had
been issued for wearing a short sleeve shirt on day designated for wearing long
sleeve shirts" (R p. 179 1. 12-20; R. p. 1841. 4-11; R. p. 417 Board of Appeals

15

Decision Finding 23). Finally, unlike the Chief in Kelly at 1054, there was no
evidence that Chief Botkin followed or had issued any form of progressive
discipline (R. p. 420 Board of Appeals Decision Conclusion 2).
The Appeal Board's decision to uphold the termination of Mr. Turner,
unlike the decision of the court in Kelly, was based only on one incident; the
surreptitiously recorded telephone conversation made at a time, as found by the
Board, when Travis Turner was under the influence of alcohol and prescription
medication. Based on this conversation alone the Board found that Travis
Turner's conduct constituted;
"conduct which discredits the District," "conduct unbecoming
an employee," and "acts evidencing moral turpitude" (R. p. 421 Board
of Appeals Decision Conclusion 3).

The charge of "conduct unbecoming an officer." requires at least a
demonstration that the officers conduct, was voluntary so that she can be shown
to be responsible for the action themselves...." Kelly, 1053; citing Perry v.
Philadelphia Civil Service Commission 529 A. 2d 616 (1987).
The Perry court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Dillon, 518 A. 2d
869 (1986) "held that such a charge requires at least a demonstration that the
officer's conduct was voluntary so that he can be shown to be responsible for the

16

action themselves, without regard to any intention which he may or may not
have had concerning their effect," Dillon 870.
In Kelly, this court recognized that the issue of whether or not Officer
Kelly's conduct was voluntary was legally significant when it stated that;
"Had Kelly not been intoxicated when she made the non-emergency
phone calls...., there is no doubt her actions would be conduct
unbecoming an officer..." Id. 1053.
The decision of the court in Kelly, was not focused on the involuntariness
of Officer Kelly's intoxicated conduct but rather, and unlike the facts in Travis
Turners case, was based on a finding by the Commission "that Officer Kelly
ingested the medication in a manner inconsistent with medical advice was
voluntary, thereby making her responsible for her conduct while intoxicated"
Kelly, 1053.
The Appeals Board in this case, made no finding that Travis Turners
intoxication was voluntary or contrary to medical advice. No evidence was
introduce that could support such a finding.
The fact that the Board found Officer Turner to be intoxicated with
alcohol and prescription medications, without any evidenced or challenge by
the Department that his intoxication was voluntary or contrary to medical
directives, demonstrates that the Board ignored the fact that Travis Turners
17

conduct was not voluntary and he should therefore not be responsible for his
conduct when it upheld his termination for "conduct unbecoming an officer "or
for any other reason, based solely upon the surreptitiously recorded telephone
conversation of September 7,2008.
ARGUMENT
POINT II
The Lone Peak Public Safety District violated Appellants Fourteenth
Amendment Substantive Due Process Rights when it upheld his termination
based solely on the content of a surreptitiously recorded private conversation
where there was no evidence of intent to communicate a threat and based further
on Appellants lack of capacity to foresee that his non remembered statements
could reasonably be interpreted as a threat, in violation of the exercise of
Appellants fundamental liberty interest in free speech as guaranteed by the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and his Substantive Due
Process Rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment,

The First Amendment guarantees the right of Freedom of Expression and
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from "depriving any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law," U.S. Const, amend. 14 Sec. 1.
The Due Process Clause "guarantees more than fair process." Seegmiller
v. Laverkin City, 528 F3 rd 762, 766 (10th Cir. 2008) citing; Washington v.
Glucksberg 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997). The Due Process Clause "covers a
substantive sphere as well, barring certain government actions regardless of the
fairness of the procedures used to implement them" Seegmiller 766, 767, citing

County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 840 (1997). In its substantive
mode, the Fourteenth Amendment provides protection against arbitrary and
oppressive government action, even when taken to further a legitimate
governmental objective, Id at 845-846.
The Supreme Court has described two strands of the substantive doctrine.
One strand protects an individual's fundamental liberty interest, while the other
protects against the exercise of governmental power that shocks the conscience
Seegmiller 767.
A fundamental right or liberty interest is one that is "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition" and "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
Seegmiller 767, citing Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775 (2003). The right
of free speech is a fundamental right or liberty interest that is deeply rooted in
our nation's history and tradition and is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty
guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The
Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe fundamental liberty
interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest." Seegmiller 161, citing
Glucksberg 521 U.S. at 721.

In this case, Travis Turner was terminated based solely on the content of a
private verbal statement, made during a 2 A.M. telephone conversation while he
was under the influence of alcohol and prescription medication (R. p. 419
rinding 14). Travis Turner did not have a memory of participating in the
conversation (R. p. 243 1. 20-23). The statement was found by the Appeal Board,
in spite of itsfindingof Travis's intoxication, to be a threat directed at the Lehi
Chief of Police justifying his termination.
Admittedly the First Amendment does not protect against threats of
violence Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969). The Supreme Court in
Watts set forth no particular definition or description of a true threat that
distinguishes an unprotected threat from protected speech Doe v. Pulaski County
Special School Dist, 306 F.3"1616 (8th Cir. 2002).
Following Watts, the lower courts were left to ascertain for themselves
when a statement triggers the government's interest in preventing the disruption
and fear of violence associated with a threat, Pulaski, 622. The Pulaski court, in
examining rulings of federal court of appeals that have announced a test to parse
true threatsfromprotected speech, found two camps of thought;
"All the courts to have reached the issue have consistently
adopted an objective test that focuses on whether a reasonable
person would interpret the purported threat as a serious expression
of an intent to cause a present or future harm. See Id. The views
20

among the courts diverge, however, in determining from whose
viewpoint the statement should be interpreted. Some ask whether a
reasonable person standing in the shoes of the speaker would
foresee that the recipient would perceive the statement as a threat,
whereas others ask how a reasonable person standing in the
recipient's shoes would view the alleged threat." Pulaski 622 citing,
"Compare Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v.
Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc), with United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. ),
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 968, 115 S. Ct 435, 130 L.Ed.2d 347 (1994).

The Utah Court is in the "camp" identified in Pulaski that focuses its
analysis of a true threat from the viewpoint of the person making the statement
rather than from the viewpoint of the person who hears the communication.
Last year this court announced the applicable standard to establish whether a
person intended to make a threat when it held that "Intent is established when a
person makes a threat that a reasonable person vtoul&foresee as being
interpreted by those to whom the defendant communicates the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm or assault", State v. Johnson 178 P.3d 915,
919 (UT. App. 2008), citing United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262,
1265 (9th Cir.1990).
Counsel for Respondent repeatedly, and contrary to the ruling of Johnson,
misstated the law by arguing that intent to make a threat is established when the
person who hears the threat takes it seriously, thus establishing a violation of the
law (R. p. 388). The Appeal Board utilized a clearly erroneous legal standard by

analyzing Mr. Turner's language from the viewpoint of the person who hears the
statement rather thanfromthe speaker's (Travis Turner) viewpoint as to whether
he could reasonably foresee the statement would be interpreted as a serious
threat.
Thefindingby the Appeal Board that Travis was under the influence of
liquor and prescription medication requires a conclusion that Travis Turner did
not have the mental acumen or ability to foresee how his statements would be
interpreted by his former spouse. Travis was so intoxicated that he did not even
remember participating in the conversation (R. p. 243 1.20-23). In effect, the
Appeal Boards ruling upheld the termination of Travis Turner because he was
intoxicated (R. p. 421 Appeal Board Conclusion 4) and without regard to
Travis's lack of capacity, to appreciate or foresee the possible effects of the
statements made to his former spouse as required by Johnson Id. 919.
Not only did Travis Turner not have the capacity to foresee the effect of
his statements, he did not have had the intent to communicate any threat at all.
To punish or discipline an individual for a true threat the speaker must have
intentionally or knowingly communicated the statement in question to someone
Pulaski, citing Planned Parenthood of the Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am.

Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1075 (9th Cir. 2002). Intent is a key
element in the Utah Statutes that provide criminal sanctions for threats.5
Before the Pulaski court commenced an analysis as to whether the letter
written by J.M. was a true threat or protected speech it considered the threshold
question of whether, J.M., intended to communicate the purported threat, Id,
624. The Pulaski court's reasoning in considering J.M.'s intent to communicate
a threat before actually analyzing the content of J.M's letter was that "requiring
less than an intent to communicate the purported threat would run afoul of the
notion that an individual's most protected right is to be free from governmental
interference in the sanctity of his home and in the sanctity of his own personal
thoughts;' Pulaski, 624 citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
The court in Pulaski ultimately found that J.M intended to communicate a
threat because he allowed a friend, D.M., to read a threatening letter that J.M,
had written. Thereafter D.M. without the knowledge or permission of J.M.
obtained a copy of the letter and delivered it to the person who the letter

5

There is no Utah Statute that specifically sanctions mere threatening language. Utah Code
Section 76-5-107 sanctions Terroristic threats if the use of a weapon of mass destruction or
the hoax of a weapon of mass destruction is threatened and then the threat is made with
specific intent.... (In this case there is no mention of a weapon of mass destruction). Utah
Code Section 76-8-313 defines assault on an elected official when he threatens to inflict
bodily injury on an elected official with the intent to impede
(In this case the Lehi Chief
of police is not an elected official
23

threatened.6 The scenario in Pulaski is very different than the case at bar. First,
J.M. intended to write a threatening letter, he was not incapacitated or
intoxicated at the time he wrote it; while Travis Turner had no intention of
communicating a threat and was intoxicated at the time. Second, J.M. knew and
appreciated that he was recording his thoughts in a written form; while Travis
Turner, who not only did not remember participating in the conversation, did not
know that his intoxicated statement was being recorded. Third, J.M. shared his
intentionally written thoughts with another individual; while Travis Turner,
again did not even remember participating in the conversation with his ex-wife.
Finally, and another major difference between thefindingsin Pulaski and this
case, the Pulaski court utilized the reasonable recipient standard, viewing the
threatfromthe viewpoint of the recipient, Id. 624 while Utah Law requires a
true threat analysis applying the viewpoint of the communicator as required by
Johnson Id. 919. An analysis of Travis Turners statement utilizing the Johnson
required analysis would require a very different conclusion because Travis
Turner, because of incapacity, could not have foreseen or contemplated the
effect of his non -remembered statement.

6

The Pulaski Court "is in the camp that views the nature of the alleged threatfromthe
viewpoint of a reasonable recipient" Pulaski 622
24

The Appeal Board clearly committed legal error resulting in the denial of
Mr. Turner's constitutional rights under the 1st and 14th Amendments to the
United States Constitution by upholding the decision of the Department to
terminate Mr. Turner
POINT III
The Lone Peak Public Safety District deprived Appellant of his property
interest in employment when it exceeded its authority by imposing a sanction for
a non-public statement in violation of Appellants First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights pursuant to the Constitution of the United States.

In this case Mr. Turner has been deprived of a property right to continued
employment which has consistently been determined to be a constitutional
protected right requiring protection of the Due Process Clause. An employee
posses a property interest in public employment if they have tenure, a contract for a
fixed term, an implied promise of continued employment, or if state law allows
dismissal only for cause or its equivalent. Darr v. Town ofTelluride Colo 495 F.3d
(10th Cir. 2007) See Id. at 576-77,92 S. Ct. 2701; Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341,
344 (1976); Greene v. Barrett, 174 F.3d 1136,1140-41 (10th Cir.1999). The Rules
and Regulations of the Department (R. Appendix 4 sub 1), together with Section
17B-1-803 UCA, establish that state law allows dismissal only for cause or its
equivalent. See also Potts v. Davis County 010609 FED10, 07-4139 United States
Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit Jan 6, 2009.
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The Rules and Regulations of the Lone Peak Public Safety District provide
notice to its employees of their required conduct "in dealing with the general
public" as follows: Section 2 GENERAL;
The conduct of Public Safety District employees in dealing with
the general public is expected and required to be commensurate with
the high level of public trust placed upon the Public Safety profession.
Any public action, inaction, attitude or opinion of personnel which
can be interpreted as unprofessional or unworthy of the public trust in
Public Safety Officials tends to undermine and detract from the public
respect of Public Safety Members individually and collectively.
(Appendix 4 sub-section 2 p.52)
The foregoing District policy, in light of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, dangerously extends to
include ""attitudes or opinions" held by the employee. The policy is tempered
and conditioned by the requirement that the attitude or opinion must be made or
demonstrated in "public."
The Fourteenth Amendment forbids the government to infringe
fundamental liberty interests at all, no matter what process is provided, unless
the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."
Seegmiller Id. 767, citing Glucksberg 521 U.S. at 721.
The District policy regarding the conduct of its employees appears to be
an attempt to narrowly tailor the situations where employees may be sanctioned
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for action, inaction or opinions demonstrated or expressed in public. Assuming,
for argument purposes only, that the District has some compelling governmental
interest to sanctioning employees for public action or expression of opinions
which may embarrass the district in a public setting, there is no question but that
the district does not have the right to abridge its employee's fundamental liberty
rights to free speech or their private opinion or belief not expressed in public.
The termination of Travis Turner deprived him of his constitutionally
protected property interest in continued employment. The termination is a
violation of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Additionally, the
termination by the District was contrary and beyond the scope of its announced
and presumably narrowly tailored policy to reserve the right to sanction
employee conduct if committed or opinions were expressed in public.
POINT IV
The Board of Appeals erred infindingthat termination was a
proportionate and proper sanction.
A determination of whether the sanction of dismissal is not proportionate
requires appellant to show either (1) that the facts do not support the action
taken by the District or (2) that the charges do not warrant the sanction imposed
Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Serv. Comm'n, 8 P.3rd 1048 (Ut. App 2000).
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In this case, the findings of the Board of Appeal and argument herein,
clearly establish that Travis Turner made unremembered statements while under
the influence of alcohol and prescription medications. The circumstances
existing at the time of the statement, as found by the Appeals Board,
demonstrate Travis Turner's lack of intent to communicate at all and equally as
important that could not have intended to make a threat. The fact that Travis
Turner made a statement, while under the influence of alcohol and prescription
medication does not support the Appeal Boards decision to affirm the
termination solely because of the content of the statement.
Based on Travis Turner's lack of intent to communicate at all, or to make
a threat, the facts relied upon by the board do not support its decision to affirm
the termination. Additionally, the Board of Appeals by upholding the
termination abused its discretion and exceeded its authority, by violating Travis
Turner's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by exceeding the narrowly
tailored scope of the Districts policy to sanction employees for acts and or
opinions stated in public (Harmon v. Ogden City Civil Service Comm 'n, 171
P.3"1 1048 (UT.APP 2007).
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Board of Appeals must be
held as an abuse of discretion because the facts do not support its conclusion and
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further that the District exceeded its authority to sanction employees for nonpublic acts or statements.
:th

DATED this 25m day of June 2009

Id D. Conder
orney for Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAIL
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and exact copy of the
foregoing Appellant's Brief to the following party on the 2^> day of June 2009:
David L. Church
5995 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
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Amendment 1 - Freedom of Religion, Press, Expression. Ratified 12/15/1791.
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
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Fourteenth Amendment
Section (1) All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
law.
Section (2) Representatives shall be appropriate among the several States
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any
election for the choice of electors for the President and Vice President of the
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers
of a State or the members of the Legislatures thereof is denied to any of the
male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of
the United States, or in any way abridge, except for participation in rebellion, or
other crime the basis representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age in such State .
Section (3) No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military,
under the United States, or under any State who, having previously taken an
oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the
33

enemies thereof. But Congress may by vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section (4) The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or
obligation in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations
and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section (5) The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
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CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Article I, Section 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.
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APPENDIX 4(1)

LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
TITLE: EMPLOYEE TERMINATION
Effective Date: 07-01-99

Revised:

Approved by: PSD Board

Dist. To: All Personnel

Section 1:

POLICY
It is the policy of this District to deal with employees fairly and equitably. Should
disciplinary action become necessary to the point of terminating employment, the
District will deal with each employee according to this policy.

Section 2:

TYPES OF REMOVAL
A.

Resignation. A full-time employee who resigns shall submit his resignation
in writing to his Department Chief and give at least two (2) weeks notice.
1.

Section 3:

The Public Safety Director, on the recommendation of the
Department Chief, may shorten or waive the notice period.

B.

Temporary employment. Temporary employees may be terminated at such
time as their assigned job is completed or funding for the project is
exhausted.

C.

Probationary employee termination. A probationary employee may be
terminated without cause.

D.

Unsatisfactory Service. An employee who has completed the probationary
period may be terminated or subject to disciplinary action if his/her
performance or conduct is not satisfactory; if he/she proves unsuited to
his/her work; or if for medical reasons he/she is no longer qualified for the
positioa

Disciplinary Procedure.
A.

Prior to termination, excluding termination pursuant to Sections 2,4 and 5
of this policy, an employee shall be given a verbal or written warning and a
reasonable time to rectify the problem.

B.

An employee whose conduct or performance is considered unsatisfactory
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shall be subject to the following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
C

Counseling
Reprimand
Decision-Making Leave
Discipline

Types of Discipline: Employees who do not correct unsatisfectory conduct
or performance, or who commit oflFenses of such a serious nature that
require immediate expulsion from work, are subject to the following:
1.

Suspension
An employee may be suspended with or without pay as a
disciplinary measure. Suspension without pay requires a predisciplinary hearing and must have the approval of the Public Safety
Director.
An employee may be suspended without pay for an indefinite period
of time as a result of a criminal complaint in a court of law, in
which case the suspension may continue until the matter is
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction. If the charges are
not sustained, the District may still administer further discipline if
the District can substantiate misconduct.

2.

Demotion
An employee may be demoted as a result of disciplinary action.
Prior to any demotion, an employee shall receive a pre-disciplinary
hearing. Said hearing will be conducted by the appropriate
Department Chief or Public Safety Director and will offer the
employee the opportunity to present any information they so desire,
in their behalf

3.

Probation
As a form of discipline an employee may be placed on probation for
a period not to exceed six (6) months in an effort to further
evaluate and rehabilitate the employee.

4.

Termination
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An employee may be terminated as a result of disciplinary action.
Prior to termination, the employee shall receive a pre-termination
hearing. Said hearing will be conducted by the appropriate
Department Chief
D-

Notification: An employee shall be notified in writing of any disciplinary
action that could lead to suspension, demotion, or termination, and shall be
afforded the opportunity to meet with the Public Safety Director (or his/her
representative) to discuss the proposed disciplinary action prior to the
action being taken- An employee may also respond to the proposed
disciplinary action in writing,

E-

Records of disciplinary action, excluding oral warnings, will be retained in
the employee's official personnel file for a two (2) year period, unless other
disciplinary action occurs. If two (2) years have passed without any further
discipline and the document is not the subject of a pending investigation,
the disciplinary record will be removed from the personnel file upon written
request of the employee to the Public Safety Director. Formal periodic
evaluations are exempt from any removal process.
The employee shall have access to his/her personnel file, along with the
employee's representative, while the employee is present. An employee
may insert into the personnel file a rebuttal statement which is directly in
response to written reprimands or negative commentary in the file. Upon
the request of any employee they shall be given a copy of any material
contained in their personnel file.
No item or information will be placed in an employee's personnel file
without the employee's knowledge. It is not necessary that the employee
agree with or approve the placement of any item or material in the
personnel file. This is simply to ensure that the enqrioyee has knowledge of
items or material(s) being placed in a personnel file. The employee's
signature or initials on the item or material is sufficient to substantiate
knowledge. Failure by an employee to sign or initial an item or material
will not prevent that item/material from being placed in the personnel file.
A supervisor will make a notation including the date on the item or material
that the employee refused to sign or initial the item or material. The item
will then be placed in the employee's personnel file.

F.

Any written record of discipline not previously provided to the employee
will not be used as basis for subsequent progressive discipline.
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Section 4:

"MSCONDUCT OR "CAUSE."
An employee may be disciplined, up to and including termination without prior
warning for the following misconduct or cause. "Misconduct'' or "Cause"
includes, but not limited to:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.
H.
L
J.
KL
L.
M.
N.
O.
P.
Q.
R.
S.
T.
U.

Section 5:

Violation of the criminal laws of the United States, the Sate of Utah or any
other state, the violation of which, had it occuiTed in Utah would be a
crime in Utah.
Violation of any provision of the Charter of any member cities of the
District
Violation of District Rules.
Outside employment which conflicts or interferes with assigned duties.
Solicitation as District employees of the public for money, goods, or
services not specifically authorized by the Public Safety Director.
Acceptance or solicitation of a bribe or any compensation intended to
influence the employee in the performance of his/her duties for the District.
Divulgence of any confidential material to anyone not authorized to receive
it.
Conduct which discredits the District.
Improper use of one's employment with the District for the employee's
personal and/orfinancialadvantage.
Insubordination.
Incompetency
Inefficiency
Neglect of duties.
Unexplained absence from duty.
Malfeasance, misfeasance or misconduct in office.
Conduct unbecoming an employee.
Acts evidencing moral turpitude.
Sexual or racial harassment action.
Willful violation of safety practices in performance of duties, including
operation of District equipment and vehicles.
Alcohol or substance abuse on the job.
Unauthorized use of District property, equipment and/or materials.

ABANDONMENT OF POST
An employee absent from duty in excess of three (3) days without a
satisfactory explanation shall be considered to have abandoned his post and
shall be terminated provided that the employee's Department Chief shall
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make a reasonable effort to locate the employee.

Section 6:

B.

Reasonable effort to locate an employee shall be satisfied if the Department
Chief sends a 44mailgram" to the employee at the address shown in the
employee's personnel file.

C.

Termination pursuant to this section shall be deemed to be for just cause.

ELIMINATION OF POSITIONS AND PROCEDURE FOR REDUCTION IN
FORCE.
A

The District may eliminate any position.

B.

When a position is eliminated and/or a reduction in force takes place, the
following procedure will apply:
An employee to be terminated because of the elimination of his/her job or a
reduction in force shall be permitted to exercise his/her seniority to move
laterally or downward within the same Department to a position for which
the employee has the immediate skill and ability. The sole determination of
the employee's skill and ability shall be determined by the District. It is
understood that any positions currently federally funded are not subject to
this procedure should a reduction in force occur due to cessation of federal
funding.
Failure to immediately perform all duties of the position subjects the
employee to immediate dismissal, with no right of recall
Should an employee elect not to use his right to move he shall have first
right of recall in accordance with his/her re-employment in relation to
filling the original position that was eliminated.

C.
Section 7:

Termination under this section shall require at least two weeks notice to
the employee or payment in lieu of notice.

NOTICE
A.

Written notification. Any termination under this Article shall be in writing
and shall set forth the reasons for such termination.
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B.

No appeal Terminations pursuant to Sections 2 (A), (B) and 6 (A) above
shall not be subject to the grievance or arbitration provisions.
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LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
TITLE: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
Effective Date: 07-01-99

Revised:

Approved by: PSD Board

Dist To: All Personnel

Section 1:

POLICY
It is the policy of this District to provide a grievance procedure for those
employee's who feel they have been dealt with in a contrary, unfair or unjust
manner.

Section 2:

PROCEDURE
A.

The purpose of the Grievance Procedure shall be to settle all grievances
between the District and the enq>loyee as quickly as possible to insure
efficiency and promote employee morale. Should any employee, group of
employees, or the District feel aggrieved, including the claim of unjust
discrimination or any matter or condition affecting health and safety beyond
those normally encountered in all phases of normal work requirements,
adjustment shall be sought as follows:
L

In order to promote harmony, the employee is encouraged to
discuss matter in dispute with the immediate supervisor first.

2.

All grievances must befiledin writing, withinfive(5) working days
after the matter in dispute or disagreement is alleged to have
occurred;

Step 1: The grievance shall first be discussed between the employee and the
immediate supervisor within five (5) working days of its filing. If the
grievance is not settled during this informal discussion, it may be processed
to Step 2.
Step 2: Within three (3) working daysfromthe date of informal discussion
with the immediate supervisors), but not later than eight (8) working days
after the act or omission giving rise to the grievance, the immediate
supervisor shall present the grievance, in writing, to the Department Chief
or his representative. The Department Chief or his representative shall
arrange for such meetings with the Employee and make such investigations
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as are necessary. The Department Chief shall respond in writing to the
aggrieved withinfive(5) working days of his receipt of said grievance. If
the response does not resolve the grievance, it may proceed to Step 3.
Step 3: Within three (3) working daysfromreceipt of the written response
from the Department Chie£ the employee shall present the grievance, in
writing, to the Public Safety Director, accompanied by all correspondence
and existing evidence on the matter. The Public Safety Director after
consultation with the aggrieved employee, will make a determination within
five (5) working daysfromthe date of submission to himu
Step 4: If a mutually satisfectory settlement cannot be reached between the
Public Safety Director and the Employee, the Employee shallfilenotice
withinfive(5) working days with the Public Safety District Board for final
determination.

C.

1.

When such notice isfiledwith the Public Safety District Board, the
Board shall hear the matter within a thirty (30) day period.

2.

If such notice is not filed within five (5) working days with the
Public Safety District Board the grievance shall be deemed
withdrawn with prejudice.

Upon afinaldetermination on the matter, having been made by the Public
Safety District Board, each party retains any legal right for further action
they deem necessary.
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LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
TITLE: INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS
Effective date: 07-01-99

Revised:

Approved By: PSD Board

Dist. To: All Personnel

Section 1:

POLICY
It is the policy of this District to investigate all complaints of possible employee
misconduct to determine whether allegations are valid or invalid and to take
appropriate action.

Section 2:

DEFINITIONS
A.

COMPLAINT
An inquiry, request or demand that the District investigate possible
employee misconduct. A complaint may be initiated by ANY person,
including District employees. Known as a "Citizen's Complaint" when
initiated by a person outside the District.

B.

ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
An administrative process whereby the District investigates complaints.

Section 3:

GUIDELINES
A.

RELEASE OF INFORMATION
Information related to an administrative investigation may only be released
to the media or outside interests at the direction of the Public Safety
District Board or their designee.

B.

COMPLAINTS WITH SIMILAR CONTEXT
When three (3) or more complaints of a similar context arise against any
one employee within any twelve (12) month period, all subsequent
complaints of that nature may be classified as FORMAL at the direction of
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the Department Chief.
C

Section 4:

POLYGRAPH/TRUTH VERIFICATION
1.

Employees will not be ordered or directed to submit to a polygraph
or truth verification examination on any matter under investigation
by this District. Nothing in this policy is intended to deny the
District from requesting an employee to submit to a polygraph or
truth verification examination. No disciplinary action may be taken
against any employee for refusing to submit to a polygraph/truth
verification examination.

2.

Nothing in this policy is intended to deny an employee the privilege
of requesting a polygraph/truth verification examination when they
feel that it is their best interest.

3.

Should a polygraph or truth verification examination be taken/given
the party requesting the examination shall pay the cost of said
examination.

CRIMINAL VS. ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS
A.

PRECEDENCE
A criminal investigation shall take precedence over an administrative
investigation. When an employee becomes the focus of a criminal
investigation, no administrative investigation shall be initiated until:
1.

Such time notification is received by the Director of Public Safety
investigation has either been concluded or initiation of an
administrative investigation would not otherwise compromise the
criminal investigation.

2.

At that time, the Director of Public Safety shall make a
determination as to whether an administrative investigation is
conducted.

3.

In cases of criminal investigations, notification to the involved
employee(s) shall not be made until such time that it is determined
by the Chief of Police that notification would not interfere with the
30
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criminal investigationB.

Section 5:
A

RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVESTIGATION
1.

All criminal investigations will be performed by the Police
Department unless otherwise directed by the Chief of Police.

2.

Administrative investigations will be performed by a supervisor.

PROCEDURES
INITIATING COMPLAINTS
2.

A complaint may be initiated by any person. A complaint may be
communicated by mail, telephone, electronic message or in person. The
complainant may identify him/herself or remain anonymous. Any person
may be informed that a complaint may be made to any of the
following:
a
b.
c.
&
e.

B.

Appropriate Department Chief
Director of Public Safety.
Any PSD Board member.
Utah County Attorney's Office.
Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI).

2.

Non-supervisory personnel initiated a personal complaint or receiving a
citizen complaint should direct the complaint/complainant to their
immediate supervisor or to a Department Chief.

3.

Supervisory personnel initiating a personal complaint receiving a citizen
complaint or having a complaint/complainant forwarded to them by nonsupervisory personnel will review the allegations and classify the complaint.
If the complaining citizen is insistent uponfilingthe complaint with the
supervisor at the time of contact, the supervisor willfillout the
CITIZEN'S COMPLAINT FORM, give the citizen witness statement
forms tofillout and forward the complaint to their Department Chief.

CLASSIFYING COMPLAINTS
1.

A complaint may be classified as INFORMAL when the complaint alleges
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minimal misconduct, the alleged violation does not meet the criteria for this
manual's definition of MISCONDUCT, and the complainant does not wish
to file a written complaint. A complaint that meets the definition of
MISCONDUCT will be classified as FORMAL and referred as outlined,
even if the complainant does not wish to file a written complaint.
2.

A complaint will be classified as FORMAL, when:
a.

the complaint may result in an employee facing discipline beyond
verbal admonishment and/or training.

b.
c.

the complaint alleges any unnecessary or excessive use offeree.
the complaint may require having the employee:
(1)
(2)
(3)

C.

participate in a lineup of any form.
submit to a medical/laboratory examination.
submitfinancialdisclosure.

FORWARDING COMPLAINTS
Once a complaint has been classified, the supervisor has three (3) options
in forwarding the complaint for preparation of investigation:

D.

1.

If the supervisor is within the involved employee's chain of
command he/she may retain and prepare the complaint for
investigation.

2.

If the supervisor is not within the involved employee's chain of
command the supervisor will forward the complaint to the
appropriate chain of command, with every effort made to forward
the complaint to a rank similar to their own.

3.

Forwarded to the accused Department Chief if the complaint is of
serious nature or may require extensive investigation (even though
not a citizen complaint).

PREPARING COMPLAINTS
1,

The preparation of INFORMAL complaints for investigation does
not require the use of any District form or report. It is the
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supervisor's responsibility to ensure that the complaint will be
professionally addressed.
2.

The preparation of FORMAL complaints for investigation requires
the use of District forms. The forms required are:
aa.
b.

3.

E.

a CITIZEN'S COMPLAINT FORM (only when initiated by
a citizen, not when initiated internally).
a NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION.
Witness Statements, from complainant or persons providing
information.

Whenever a NOTICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION
is prepared a copy shall be immediatelyforwarded,through the
chain of command, to the OflSce of the Director of Public Safety. A
copy will also be given to the Public Safety District Board to inform
them of the investigatioa

INVESTIGATING INFORMAL COMPLAINTS
Supervisors investigating complaints classified as INFORMAL, shall:
L

Notify the involved employee who is the focus of the complaint no
later than ten (10) calendar days after receipt/initiation of the
complaint by the District and allow the employee to respond to the
complaint in writing.

2.

Conclude the investigation and forward a memo indicating
resolution to the Department Chief

3.

Notify the involved employee of the resolution of the INFORMAL
complaint The employee may again respond in writing and have
such writing included in the completed investigative package, a
complete copy of which shall then be provided to the involved
employee.

4.

Refer to Section F of this policy if at any point during an
INFORMAL investigation, a determination is made that a
FORMAL investigation is required
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5.
F.

Forward complete INFORMAL investigative package to the
Department Chief.

INVESTIGATING FORMAL COMPLAINTS
Supervisors investigating complaints classified as FORMAL, shall:
1.

Notify the involved employee who is the focus of the complaint no
later than ten (10) calendar days after receipt/initiation of the
complaint by the District. Notification shall be made by having the
employee sign and receive a copy of a NOTICE OF
ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION.

2.

Obtain a written or tape recorded statement from the employee
concerning the allegations outlined in the complaint.

3.

Notify the Department Chiefs through the chain of command, in
writing every ten (10) calendar days as to the status of the on-going
investigation.

4.

Conclude the investigation and forward a SUPERVISOR'S
REPORT OF DISCREPANCY to the Department Chief through
the chain of command.

The Department Chief shall:
5.

Review the material assign a disposition and indicate what action is
to be taken, if any.

6.

Notify the involved employee and the complainant, if known, of the
resolution of the FORMAL complaint.

7.

The employee may again respond in writing and have such writing
included in the investigative package, a complete copy of which will
then be provided to the employee.

8.

Notification to the complainant shall include only the disposition of
the complaint and shall not include supporting documents or action
taken.
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G.

DISPOSITIONS
When an Administrative Investigation has been concluded, a disposition
shall be assigned as follows;
1.
2.
3.
4.
56.

H.

Exonerated: the alleged conduct occurred, but was lawftd or
proper.
Unfounded: the allegation is false or not factual.
Not Sustained: insufficient evidence to either prove or disprove
allegation.
Sustained: sufficient evidence to prove the allegation.
Misconduct Not Bases on Original Complaint: sustained acts of
misconduct, not alleged in the complaint.
Policy/Procedure Failure: Flaw in policy caused incident.

DISCIPLINARY ACTION
Disciplinary action may include:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Training.
Counseling.
Verbal reprimand.
Written reprimand.
Suspension without pay.
Probation.
Demotion.
Termination.

Discipline received may be one or more of the above listed actions
depending on the severity of the infraction/misconduct.
L

RETAINING ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATION PACKAGES
All complaints and investigative packaged shall be retained by the Director
of Public Safety. No other record of a complaint shall be made in any other
file, except when disciplinary action is taken following a FORMAL
complaint. A copy of the letter sent to the employee by the Department
Chief indicating the disciplinary to be taken shall be forwarded to the
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employee's District Personnel File and immediate supervisor for reference
purposes.
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LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT
Citizen's Complaint Form
To be completed by District Employee Receiving Complaint
Sex:

.Age:_

Race:
.Apt;
State:

Phone:{

(Home); (

L

. Zip*--

L

JWork)

Location of Occurrence:
Date & Time of Occurrence:
Alleged Misconduct of Employee (brief narrative):^

Person Receiving Complaint:

Time:

Date:

Hrs.

NOTE: CITIZEN WILL BE ADVISED OR RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

Under Utah Law it is a misdemeanor offense to give false information to a peace officer.

Signed:^
Receiving Supervisor

Citizen
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LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
TITLE: MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
Effective date: 07-01-99

Revised:

Approved By: PSD Board

Section 1:

Dist. To: All Personnel

POLICY
It is policy of this District to maintain specific rights, by management for the
purpose of efficient operation of the District.

Section 2:

EXPRESS RIGHTS
A.

The District possesses the solerightto operate the District and all
management rights remain with the District. These rights include, but are
not limited to, the following:
L

The right to hire, direct, assign, promote, transfer, classify, suspend,
demote, discharge, or discipline employees;

2.

The right to maintain the efficiency of its operations;

3.

The right to relieve any employee from duty, to reduce in force or
lay off any employee because of lack of work or lack of funds. Or
for any other legitimate reason;

4.

The right to determine appropriate staffing levels and work
performance standards;

5.

The right to determine the content of the work day including the
work load, the number of days which will constitute the work
week, the number of hours which will constitute the work day, and
the specific day to be designated as payday;

6.

The right to determine the quality and quantity of services offered
to the public, and the manner and means of offering those services;

7.

The right to issue, amend or revise policies, rules, regulations and
practices it deems necessary to cany out all managerial and
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administrative prerogatives and;
8.
Section 3:

Therightto establish, change, combine, or eliminate jobs, positions,
job classifications and descriptions.

OTHER RIGHTS
The above are inclusive management rights, but other rights may also be possessed
by the District.
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APPENDIX 4 (2)

LONE PEAK PUBLIC SAFETY DISTRICT
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
TITLE: PERSONAL CONDUCT
Effective date: 07-01-99

Revised:

Approved By: PSD Board

Dist To: All Personnel

Section 1:

POLICY
It is the policy of this District that all employee's personal conduct is such that no
discredit nor lack of public trust is placed upon the District-

Section 2:

GENERAL
The conduct of Public Safety District employees in dealing with the general public
is expected and required to be commensurate with the high level of public trust
placed upon the Public Safety profession. Any public action, inaction, attitude or
opinion of personnel which can be interpreted as unprofessional or unworthy of the
public trust in Public Safety Officials tends to undermine and detract from the
public respect of Public Safety Members individually and collectively.
Without this public respect, our jobs become extremely difficult, if not impossible.
This respect, however, cannot be legislated by any authority. Public respect must
be earned by exemplary conduct in the performance of duties.
Each member shall so regulate his or her conduct so that no action on his or her
part could result in unfavorable criticism of any such sworn or civilian employee of
the District.

Section 3:

CONDUCT
The following acts or omissions shall be prohibited by members of the District. A
member may be disciplined or dismissed from the District for any act herein
enumerated if the act seriously impairs department operations or seriously
undermines the public confidence in the Department or District.
A.

Members shall not willfully violate any Federal, State, local law or
ordinance.

B.

Members shall not engage in games of chance in violation of any law

52

TITLE: PERSONAL CONDUCT
except in performance of duty, with appropriate consent.
C.

Members shall not possess or use marijuana or any other form or illegal
contraband, including unauthorized narcotics.

B.

Members shall be respectful, courteous and civil with the public and each
other and shall not use coarse, loud, indecent, profane or unnecessarily
harsh language, or in any way conduct themselves in a disorderiy manner.

C.

Members shall not become a part of any organization, association,
movement, group, or combination which has adopted a policy of
advocating violence or acts offeree to deny others their constitutional
rights; or who seek to alter the form of government by unconstitutional
means; or who advocate racial or religious discrimination as a political
philosophy or objective.

D.

Members shall not misuse the Public Safety radio. Misuse will include:
inappropriate language, unprofessional phrases or slang, use of the Public
Safety District radio system for personal reasons or personal gain.

E.

No member shall be derelict in their duty. The following acts or omissions
shall constitute dereliction of duty:
1.

Failure to obey orders, willful or repeated violation of any rule,
regulation, or policy of the department.

2.

Failure to make a proper report of incidence investigated, observed,
or reported.

3.

Failure of a member to give his or her name to any citizen upon
request or failure to display District identification if in civilian
clothes and off-duty. Under exceptional circumstances, such as
authorized undercover work, or for the members personal security,
this regulation may be suspended.

4.

For any member to be absent on unauthorized leave.

5.

For cowardice or failure to support fellow members or Mure to
perform official duties because of fear.
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6-

For sleeping while on duty (except in authorized circumstances).

7.

For failure to complete required training requirements,

8.

For neglect of duty.

9.

For displaying reluctance to properly perform assigned duties, or
acting in a manner tending to bring discredit upon himself herself
or the District. Failing to assume responsibility or exercise
diligence and interest in pursuit of duties, or displaying a lack of
energy of such character as to amount to incompetency.

10.

For criticism of superior or fellow officers.

11.

For political activities while on duty or in a duty role.

12.

Conduct unbecoming to a Public Safety employee,

13.

Failure of a Supervisor or Commander to immediately take action
when the violation comes to his/her attention.

F.

Members shall avoid unnecessary conversations or controversy and give his
or her name in a respectful manner to any person who may request the
same when acting in any official capacity.

G.

Members shall avoid answering questions in a short or abrupt manner and
shall give the greatest possible attention and courtesy.

H.

Members shall not loiter in cafes, drive-ins, or other public places except
for the purpose of conducting District business or tajdng regular meals or
refreshments.

L

Members shall not use their position with the District to gain any personal
advantage concerning the obtaining of goods, products or services.

J.

Members shall not appropriate lost, found, stolen evidence or District
property to his/her own use,

K.

Members shall not feign sickness or injury to escape duty.
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Section 4:

L.

Members shall handle all District property with care in an effort to prevent
damage due to carelessness.

M.

When off duty, police officers may carry or have in their immediate
possession their badge, weapon and issues identification.

DRESS - COURT/TRAINING CLASSES
A.

Members appearing in any Court or public hearing shall be dressed either in
full uniform, (including a sidearm for police officers); or conservative
clothing which shall include a necktie and jacket. Members shall not
appear in court in part of the official uniform or in what is termed "sports
attire,"
Police Officers wearing civilian clothing may carry an off-duty weapon if
they so desire so long as the weapon is covered and the Police Officer is
carrying appropriate Police I.D.

B.

All members shall dress appropriately when attending training classes.
Unless otherwise directed by the type of training received, (Le. firearms,
defensive tactics, etc.), all members will wear neat, clean conservative
clothing. Each member will present himselfTherself with a professional
appearance as he/she represents himseliTherself at training classes and
represent the District.
The only exception to this policy will be in the event of emergency call-out
where no previous notice was given.

Section 5:

PUBLIC APPEARANCES
On occasion, Public Safety personnel are requested or invited to make public
appearances on radio, television, or publicly in an official capacity. Such
invitations will not be accepted unless the Department Chief has reviewed and
approved such an appearance. Any member may make appropriate
recommendations concerning official public appearances and suggest the member
most appropriate for the occasion. Members should strongly consider referring

requests for public appearance to the respective Department Chief. Any unplanned
public appearance does not necessitate prior approval by the Department Chief
Section 6:

USE OF ALCOHOL
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Section 7:

A.

No member shall drink or purchase intoxicants while wearing his/her
uniform.

B.

No member shall drink intoxicants while on duty unless authorized in the
performance of duty (i.e. undercover).

C

No member shall report for a regular tour of duty or be on a regular tour of
duty while under the influence of alcohol, or be unfit for duty because of
such use. The odor of an alcoholic beverage on the breath will be
considered suspicion for impairment entitled see section of rules and
regulation on Alcohol/Drug free work place.

K.

No member shall consume, nor keep intoxicating liquor at any Public
Safety building, locker room, a District vehicle, or upon any property
allotted for the use of the District. This does not apply to legally seized
evidence being transported pursuant to an active case. Nor does this
section apply to the police evidence vault.

L.

Members shall not appear in public places while intoxicated, whether on or
off-duty.

M.

Members shall not excessively use intoxicants.

USE OF NARCOTICS
A

No member shall use or purchase narcotics while wearing his/her uniform.

B-

Member shall not use or possess narcotics, nor dangerous or habit forming
drugs, unless such drugs or narcotics are property prescribed by a physician
or dentist for an illness, injury, or other such legitimate treatment

C

Allowances for possession and simulated of drugs by undercover agents
shall be made.

D.

No member shall consume, nor keep narcotics at any public safety building,
any locker room, a District vehicle, or upon any property allotted for the
use of the District This does not apply to legally seized evidence being
transported pursuant to an active case. Nor does this section apply to
evidence.
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Section 7:

INCOMPETENCE
Members shall conduct their duties in a competent and efficient manner and are
expected to exercise good judgement in the performance of their assignments.
A.

LOW PERFORMANCE
Members shall not engage in any activity that lowers their ability to
perform their assignment and obligations.

Section 8:

PATRIOTIC COURTESY
On all public occasions, all of the members of the Police Department who
are in uniform shall salute the National Colors and the playing of the
National Anthem with the hand solute in a military manner. The only
exception shall be whenever officers are performing police duty requiring
immediate action or in formation when salute is made by Commander or
Officer in charge.

B.

Section 9:

All civilian employees and all members of the District who are not in
uniform shall render the National Colors and the National Anthem the
honors and courtesies customarily accorded to them. Such members shall
stand at attention, and the men shall remove their hats while the National
Colors are passing by and while the National Anthem is being played.

RELIGIOUS AND PERSONAL VIEWS
Members shall not, while on duty or in uniform, engage in religious debates or
discussions to the detriment of good discipline, nor speak despairingly of the
nationality, race or beliefs of any person.

Section 10:

GRATUITIES
A.

PURPOSE
The intent of this is to set forth the policy of the District relative to the
acceptance of gratuities or gifts by members of this District.

B.

POLICY
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C.

1.

It shall be the policy of this District to follow guidelines set forth in
the Utah State Code which deals with accepting gifts or loans.
(Utah Code 67-16-5)

2.

All members of this District, including sworn, non-sworn,
temporary, and part-time, shall not solicit or encourage gratuities or
gifts to be offered, while either on-duty or off-duty.

GRATUITIES OR GIFTS DELIVERED
Any gratuity or gift with a value of $50 or more delivered to any member
of this District for his/her own use or dissemination among other members
shall be immediately reported to the Recipients Department Chie£ who
intern will relay this information to the Director of Public Safety.
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APPENDIX 5

76-5-107. Terroristic threat - Penalty.
(1) A person commits a terroristic threat if he threatens to commit any offense
involving bodily injury, death, or substantial property damage, and:
(a) he threatens the use of a weapon of mass destruction, as defined in Section
76-10-401, or threatens by the use of a hoax weapon of mass destruction, as
defined in Section 76-10-401; or
(b) he acts with intent to:
(i) intimidate or coerce a civilian population or to influence or affect the
conduct of a government or a unit of government;
(ii) cause action of any nature by an official or volunteer agency organized to
deal with emergencies;
(iii) place a person in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, substantial bodily
injury, or death; or
(iv) prevent or interrupt the occupation of a building or a portion of the
building, a place to which the public has access, or a facility or vehicle of public
transportation operated by a common carrier.
(2) (a) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) or (l)(b)(i) is a second degree felony.
(b) A violation of Subsection (l)(b)(iv) is a third degree felony.
(c) Any other violation of this section is a class B misdemeanor.
(3) It is not a defense under this section that the person did not attempt to or was
incapable of carrying out the threat.
(4) A threat under this section may be express or implied.
(5) A person who commits an offense under this section is subject to
punishment for that offense, in addition to any other offense committed, including
the carrying out of the threatened act.
(6) In addition to any other penalty authorized by law, a court shall order any
person convicted of any violation of this section to reimburse any federal, state, or
local unit of government, or any private business, organization, individual, or
entity for all expenses and losses incurred in responding to the violation, unless the
court states on the record the reasons why the reimbursement would be
inappropriate.

APPENDIX 6

76-8-313. Threatening elected officials — Assault
A person commits assault on an elected official when he attempts or threatens,
irrespective of a showing of immediate force or violence, to inflict bodily injury to
the elected official with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the
elected official in the performance of his official duties or with the intent to
retaliate against the elected official because of the performance of his official
duties.

76-8-314, Threatening elected officials — "Elected official" defined.
As used in this section, "elected official" means:
(1) any elected official of the state, county, or city and includes the members of
the official's immediate family;
(2) any temporary judge appointed to fill a vacant judicial position;
(3) any judge not yet retained by a retention election;
(4) any member of a school board; and
(5) any person appointed to fill a vacant position of an elected official as
defined in Subsection (1).

